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Anderson: The Reclaiming Seller under UCC Section 2-702 vs. His Four Horsem

THE RECLAIMING SELLER UNDER UCC SECTION 2-702

VS.
HIS FOUR HORSEMEN OF THE APOCALYPSE
EUGENE M. ANDERSON, JR.*

When a seller delivers goods to a buyer expecting in exchange an
agreed-upon price, but does not receive that price, he quite reasonably
expects the legal system to provide redress. An obvious remedy would
be to allow the seller to reclaim the goods. In allowing such a remedy,
the common law at an early date recognized differences in justifiable
expectations and relative equities between the cash seller as opposed to
the unsecured credit seller. General rules, varying in substantial measure by jurisdiction, were developed to govern both the seller versus
cash-buyer and seller versus credit-buyer relationships. It was further
perceived that the equities and expectations of the respective relationships would be subject to those of third parties.'
The draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code codified the common law rules that had governed these relationships, and their statutory
provisions have remained basically unchanged in succeeding official
versions with the exception of one substantial change in 1966.2 In
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, A.B., Washington & Lee University; J.D., Duke University; LL.M., University of Virginia. The
author wishes to express his appreciation to Edward F. Halloran and Kenneth F. Nye
for their assistance in the preparation of this article.

1. The common law was carefully reviewed in the case of Samuels & Co. v.
Mahon, 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975). The court there noted that the significance of
classifying a sale as a cash or credit transaction was historically important because of
the passing of title concept. On a sale for cash, the seller of goods implicitly reserved
the title to the goods until payment was made in full. If the buyer defaulted, the seller's
action was one in replevin. On the other hand, the buyer obtained full title on a credit
sale; if the buyer defaulted, the seller could maintain an action on the price. Id. at 144.
As to third parties, this was an important distinction because under a cash sale, a defaulting buyer could not pass title and the unpaid seller could reclaim from the otherwise
bona fide purchaser. But, if it was a credit sale, then the seller was without relief
against the third party because the original buyer had acquired full title. Id. at 144.
See also 2 S. WILLISTON, THE LAw GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS § 346A, at 343 (rev.
ed. 1948); Corman, Cash Sales, Worthless Checks and the Bona Fide Purchaser, 10
VAND. L. REV. 55 (1956); Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase,
63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954).
2. See Braucher, Reclamation of Goods from a Fraudulent Buyer, 65 MIcH. L.
REV. 1281, 1285 (1967).
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view of the controversy and irreconcilable decisions they have produced,
it is doubtful, however, that their immutability is attributable to the
8
clarity of their meaning.
Section 2-702 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs the rights of
a reclaiming unsecured credit seller and is, of necessity, the initial

starting point of this attempt to ascertain the rights of the credit seller
vis-A.-vis those of third parties.' A cursory examination of section 2702(2) leads to the conclusion that it is concerned only with a resolution of expectations and equities between the unpaid seller and insolvent

buyer or, more specifically, the right of the seller to reclaim from the
buyer in certain specific instances.'

On the other hand, it seems that

the principal purpose of section 2-702(3) is to make this right "subject
to the rights of three classes of third parties."

This statement is

followed by an enigmatic cross-reference to section 2-403, and it is
generally thought, but by no means universally concluded, that section
3. It is noted by Professor Frank Kennedy in his article, Kennedy, The Interest of
a Reclaiming Seller Under Article 2 of the Code, 30 Bus. LAw. 833 n.3 (1975), that
Judge Braucher in his 1967 article listed 22 references to published articles and comments on the controversy. Kennedy lists 15 additional references, and at least two
more articles deserve incorporation. Bjornstad, Reclamation of Goods by Unsecured
Sellers in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 357 (1975); Henson, Reclamation
Rights of Sellers Under Section 2-702, 21 N.Y.L.F. 41 (1975).
4. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702 (1962 version) provides in pertinent part:
(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while
insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after
the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in writing within three months before delivery the ten day limitation
does not apply. Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base
a right to reclaim goods on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay.
(3) The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of
a buyer in ordinary course or other good fatih purchaser or lien creditor under
this Article (Section 2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes all
other remedies with respect to them.
In 1966, the Permanent Editorial Board recommended the deletion of the words "or lien
creditors" from subsection (3) and this was reflected in the Official 1972 version.
U.C.C. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD, 1966 OFFICIAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMEND-

MENT OF THE U.C.C. 1 (1967). In addition to the fifteen states listed in Henson, Reclamation Rights of Sellers under Section 2-702, 21 N.Y.L.F. 41 n.2 (1975), two additional states have adopted the provision. IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.2702(3) (Supp.
1976); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-702(3) (1972).
The change is controversial, and a
discussion of the results under both versions is necessary in view of the number of stateswhich have not yet adopted it. For instance, Texas has adopted the 1972 version of
Article 2, but has refused to adopt the § 2-702(3) provision. See TEx. Bus. & COMM.
CODE ANN. § 2-702(3) (Tex. UCC 1968). Although the rights of the credit-seller and
the cash-seller may in some respects parallel one another, the focus of this article is
solely on the rights of the reclaiming, unsecured credit seller as opposed to those of certain classes of third parties.
5. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702(2).
6. See id. § 2-702(3) (1962 version).
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2-702(3) is the beginning of the search for the rights of third parties
as opposed to those of reclaiming sellers. Section 2-702(3), therefore,
by declaring that the "seller's right . . . is subject to the rights of [1]
a buyer in the ordinary course or [2] other good faith purchaser or
[3] lien creditor under this [a]rticle ' 7 implies a limitation of this reclamation right by the possible intervening rights of the three classes
of third parties.
Certainly, there is an interaction of the rights of the reclaiming credit
seller with the rights of these three specifically enumerated classes of
third parties. A fourth class, the trustee in bankruptcy of the insolvent
buyer, sometimes fits within one of the three classifications and should
be considered concurrently with the other three. These four classes
are the barriers that the unsecured credit seller must overcome in
order to reclaim his goods.
It is strongly suggested that the nature of the right granted in subsection (2) to the reclaiming seller is determinative of the results of its
interaction with those rights of the classes of third parties to which it is
subjected by subsection (3) of 2-702. There is no agreement among
the cases or the commentators, however, as to the nature of either of
these rights. If one is tempted to join Justice Holmes in concluding that
"the word 'right' is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls," then the author
sympathizes, but the Code draftsmen did use the word "right" to
describe the conflicting powers of the reclaiming seller and third parties.
Thus, the nature of the rights of the third parties in subsection (3) of 2702 must be examined and categorized. This will be done in part one
of the discussion. Similarly, the nature of the right of the reclaiming
seller in subsection (2) of 2-702 must be analyzed in light of the
definitions established in part one. This right and its interaction with
the rights of third parties will be the theme of part two.
NATURE OF THE RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES

A basic tenet of this article is that the interaction between the rights
of the enumerated classes of third parties and those of the reclaiming
seller can only be understood by examining the nature of each class
respectively. This fundamental step is necessary because section 2-702
does not say that the rights of the reclaiming seller are subordinate to
those of these three classes, but rather subject to those rights.' The
7. Id. § 2-702(3) (1962 version).
8. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U.S. 350, 358 (1921).
9. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702(3).
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draftsmen were certain in their use of "subject to" because in other
sections of the Code they specifically used "subordinate to" when that
was their intention.' 0
I.

Buyer in OrdinaryCourse

The buyer in ordinary course of business is the first third party class

mentioned in section 2-702(3) and the intentions of the statute are

manifest. Article 1 definitions are applicable to article 2," and section

1-201(9) defines buyer in ordinary course of business as one "who in
good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of
the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods
buys in ordinary course from a person inthe business of selling goods of
2 The definition, as the
that kind but does not include a pawnbroker."'

comment to section 1-201(9) points out, was adopted from the Uniform Trust Receipts Act,' 8 and cases under that Act are helpful as
guides in uncertain situations."'
Section 2-403(2) delineates the interaction of the rights of a buyer in

ordinary course of business with the rights of one who entrusts goods to

a merchant dealer in that kind of goods."' Under the rules of this
section, the purchaser in ordinary course of business will prevail over
the party who does such entrusting. Making a credit sale to a merchant
dealer would thus fall within the definition of "entrusting" as set out in
10. See id. § 9-301(1). The draftsmen also used the word "priority" freely. Id.
§§ 9-312, -313.
11. Id. § 1-201 (introductory sentence).
12. Id. § 1-201(9).
13. Id. § 1-201(9),Comment9.
14. There is authority that the case law concerning the buyer in ordinary course
of business under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act is viable under the Code. General
Elec. Credit Corp. v. R.A. Heintz Constr. Co., 302 F. Supp. 958 (D. Ore. 1969). See
also Commercial Discount Co. v. Mehne, 108 P.2d 735 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940) (if only
a small portion of the purchase money was for present value, bona fides of the transaction would be questionable); Colonial Fin. Co. v. De Benigno, 7 A.2d 841 (Conn. 1939)
(includes not just consumers but retailers, sub-dealers and agents of dealers, and has refused to fractionalize sale allowing buyer in the ordinary course status for entire purchase price even when part goes for the cancellation of a preexisting debt).
15. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403(2). Note that the definition of a buyer
in ordinary course of business requires that he must do his buying from a person who
is in the business of selling goods of that kind. Id. § 1-201(9). The operative language
of section 2-403(2) is entrusting "to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind." Id.
§ 2-403(2) (emphasis added). The article 2 definition of merchant includes "a person
who deals in goods of the kind." Id. § 2-104(1). Little seems to be gained by all of
this and the references in section 2-403(2) might well have been left out since the buyer
in the ordinary course of business by definition must be buying from a person who deals
in goods of that kind.
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section 2-403(3).'"

No more need be said of the rights of a reclaiming

seller as opposed to those of a buyer in ordinary course of business-it
is clear that the reclaiming seller will lose.
II.

The Good FaithPurchaserfor Value

Unlike the precisely defined buyer in ordinary course of business, an
intelligible definition of a good faith purchaser cannot be found in the
Code. At best, the term can be understood as the product of a
combination of three or four different definitions. The most basic of
these definitions is the Code's concept of purchase, which is the "taking
by sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue,

gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in proper7
ty."

1

Section 1-201(19) of the Code defines good faith as "honesty in
fact.' 8 The reference to the good faith purchaser in section 2-702(3)
also cross-refers to section 2-403, which introduces the concept that the

purchase must be for value. Section 1-201(44) contains an unremarkable definition of value.1 9 Since neither the concept of good faith nor
the concept of value is a significant departure from pre-Code law, an
analysis of the term "purchase" must be undertaken.
The Uniform Sales Act did not attempt an inclusive definition of

purchaser such as has been given in the Code.

The draftsmen there

16. Id. § 2-403(3) states that:
'Entrusting' includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of possession
regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the possessor's disposition of the goods have been such as to be larcenous under the criminal law.
17. Id. § 1-201(32). Note, however, that a "purchaser" is considered to be one who
takes by purchase. Id. § 1-201(33).
18. Id. § 1-201(19). The Uniform Sales Act section 76(2) utilized the common
law subjective test of good faith and it was carried forward to UCC section 1-201(19).
In the case of merchants, the Code adds the requirement of observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2103(1) (b).
19. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(44) provides:
[A] person gives value for rights if he acquires them (a) in return for a binding
commitment to extend credit or for the extension of immediately available credit
whether or not drawn upon and whether or not a charge back is provided for in
the event of difficulties in collection; or (b) as security for or in total or partial
satisfaction of a preexisting claim; or (c) by accepting delivery pursuant to a preexisting contract for purchase; or (d) generally, in return for any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.
The common law concept of value did not include the grant of security for an antecedent
debt, the giving of an executory promise, or the satisfaction of an antecedent debt.
Under the Uniform Sales Act section 76(1), however, these were all instances of giving
value.
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were content to merely conclude that "purchase includes taking as a
mortgagee or pledgee."20 This is far different from including "any
voluntary transaction creating an interest in property,"21 by which the
draftsmen of the current Code apparently intended the inclusion of any
security interest in goods created by contract "which secures payment or
performance of an obligation."2 2 Nor does it seem necessary that such
an interest be perfected. 23 It is this apparent change in the definition of
purchaser which has caused the difficulty for reclaiming sellers and

bankruptcy trustees alike. This difficulty is increased by the fact that
security interests now include "floating liens" making any and, if granted in the security agreement, all after-acquired property of the debtor

subject to the creditor's security interest.24 It is apparent that in order
to determine who is a good faith purchaser, the Code definitions of
purchase, good faith, and value must be combined. The problem is
that the resulting determination is unsatisfactory and uncertain.

The common law well knew a person called a bona fide purchaser.
The concept of a bona fide purchaser was developed from his rights
which were based on the concept of title. Under the pre-Code law, a

bona fide purchaser would take free of the rights of a reclaiming seller if
he took from a purchaser who had voidable title or if the original seller
were estopped to deny title. 5 He would take subject to the rights of the
20. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 76(1); see Bankruptcy Act § 1(5), 11 U.S.C. § 1(5)
(1970).
21. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(32).
22. Id. § 1-201(37); see Jordan v. Butler, 156 N.W.2d 778, 785 (Neb. 1968); 1 R.
ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201:99(i), at 134 (2d ed. 1970).
23. It is only in article 9 that this distinction between perfected and unperfected
security interests is made. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-201, -301, and -203,
Comment 1. But cf. id. § 9-113.

24. Id. § 9-204, Comment 2. This position will apparently survive attacks by even
bankruptcy trustees. See Grain Merchants, Inc. v. Union Bank & Say. Co., 408 F.2d
209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969).
25. See note 1 supra. In the late 1800's the bona fide purchaser was subordinate
to the rights created by a seller's express reservation of ownership (title) in delivered
goods under the maxim "no one can transfer greater title than he has." Subsequently
there was a great rise in litigation involving cases wherein a seller was defrauded by
a purchaser who then attempted to pass title to another who had purchased for value
and without knowledge of the fraud committed by his seller. Since in many cases it
was perceived that reasonable expectations and equities favored this subsequent bona fide
purchaser, the courts developed the theory of voidable title to protect such a purchaser.
Under this theory, where the owner of goods voluntarily transferred and delivered possession to a buyer he was found to have intended to confer full title subject to the condition subsequent that he would be paid his price; hence there was a voidable title. If
this buyer in turn sold to a bona fide purchaser, however, the condition would be defeated and this second purchaser would receive good title. The voidable title theory originated with the English case of Parker v. Patrick, 101 Eng. Rep. 99 (K.B. 1793), and
gained favor in the late 1800's. The development of the theory in the United States
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reclaiming seller if his transferee did not have title, as in cases of
obtaining the goods by a cash sale26 or by theft.2 7 The Uniform Sales
Act, thereafter, continued this common law approach.2"
Because of the different and expanded definition of purchaser (pur-

chase) in the Code, it is not as easy to delimit good faith purchaser in
terms of his rights as it was to characterize the bona fide purchaser
under the common law. Furthermore, the Code fails to clarify the
rights of the good faith purchaser vis-A-vis the reclaiming seller. Again,
section 2-702 simply says that the rights of a reclaiming seller are
subject to not subordinate to the rights of a good faith purchaser.2" This

in itself is neutral, and the reader is thrown by the cryptic crossreference to the "rights of a
(Section 2-403)."0

. .

.good faith purchaser under this Article

Section 2-403 seems to be the only point at which the rights of a good
faith purchaser are defined in article 2. Although this section states
that a person with voidable title may transfer good title to a good faith
purchaser for value, the concept of voidable title is not defined in the
Code. It might be concluded that common law concepts were intended
to apply, but such is not the case. Four instances of voidable title are
given in section 2-403, all of which expand the theory of voidable title
to some extent. 31 It is tempting to treat these as an exclusive enumeration of situations resulting in voidable title, but this is not the intent of
paralleled that of England. Corman, Cash Sales, Worthless Checks and the Bona Fide
Purchaser, 10 VAND. L. REV. 55, 56-59 (1956).
26. An exception to the voidable title theory was the cash sale, in which it was
agreed that the transaction was to be for cash or in exchange for a check. Until the
cash was paid or the check honored no title would pass and no bona fide purchaser could
take free unless the original seller was estopped to deny transferring title, as where he
placed indicia of ownership in the purchaser. See Guckeen Farmers Elevator Co. v.
Cargill, Inc., 130 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Minn. 1964); R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF SALES § 170, at 515 (1970).
27. See R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 170, at 515 (1970).,
If possession was not given voluntarily by the original owner as in the case of a theft,
no title was intended to pass and a bona fide purchaser took subject to the original
party's rights in the goods.
28. UNIFORM SALES Acr § 24.
29. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702(3).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 2-403(1) states:
A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title
to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase
the purchaser has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or
(c)it was agreed that the transaction was to be a 'cash sale,' or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the
criminal law.
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the statute, and the results would not, as policy-oriented law, be proper.
Rather, it would seem that the good faith purchaser is protected in all
cases where goods were delivered to his transferor under a transaction of
purchase. 2 Since theft is not a transaction of purchase, 33 the good
faith purchaser would not take free of the owner's claim where his
transferee is a thief. This seems to be the only instance under section 2403 in which the good faith purchaser would not take free of the
owner's claim.
When read with the definition of purchaser, which courts have held
to include lien creditors and secured parties holding "floating liens" (the
attachment of a security interest upon after-acquired property), 34 the

result is a vastly expanded concept of a good faith purchaser over that of
32. At this point it is important to distinguish between the two purchasers discussed
in section 2-403. The first purchaser (purchaser 1), the insolvent buyer discussed in
this article, is the purchaser of the voidable title. Subsection (1) requires that goods
be delivered to purchaser 1 with the words, "[wihen goods have been delivered under
a transaction of purchase ...... UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403(1) (emphasis
added). Thus, the broad definition of purchase in section 1-201(32) is not applicable
to this purchaser since taking by lien, normally a security interest, is not usually accompanied by delivery of the goods, with the obvious exception of taking a pledge. The
rights of those who take by a form of purchase other than where goods are delivered
are governed by other articles. Id. § 2-403(4). The second purchaser referred to in
section 2-403 is the party who purchases from the party with the voidable title (purchaser 1) and receives good title. He will be referred to as purchaser 2 and is the buyer
in the ordinary course of business, the good faith purchaser (including the secured
party), and the lienor (including the trustee in bankruptcy) discussed in this article.
Purchaser 2 may take by any form of purchase including taking a security interest or
lien. Id. § 2-403, Comment 1. The first sentence of UCC section 2-403(1) states that
"[a] purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to
transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent
of the interest purchased." If "limited interest" is read to include a security interest,
in addition to a simple fractional interest in the corpus of the goods as in the case of
purchaser 1 to whom the goods must be delivered, and "purchaser" is read to include
purchaser 2, the effect discussed in comment 1 of section 2-403 is realized where it
states that "[t]he basic policy of our law allowing transfer of such title as the transferor
has is generally continued and expanded under subsection (1). In this respect the provisions of this section are applicable to a person taking by any form of 'purchase', as defined by this Act." Id. § 2-403, Comment 1.
33. Here the good faith purchaser will have purchased from one to whom goods
have not been delivered under a transaction of purchase. The thief did not receive the
goods under a voluntary transaction mandated by section 1-201(32) and was not a purchaser. It can also be reasoned that there was no delivery in the sense of putting and
holding goods at the buyer's disposition required by the Code. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-503. See generally 3 R. DUESENBERG &
FERS UNDER THE U.C.C. § 1.03[4], at 1-17 (1976);
WILLISTON ON SALES

L. KING, SALES AND BULK TRANS1 A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA,

§ 5-1, at 94 (4th ed. 1973).

34. United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064 (10th Cir. 1974); In re
Hayward Woolen Co., 3 UCC REP. SERV. 1107 (D. Mass. 1967) (referee opinion); Theodore Hamm Brewing Co. v. First Trust & Sav. Bank, 242 N.E.2d 911 (Ill. Ct. App.
1968); Evans Prod. Co. v. Jorgensen, 421 P.2d 978 (Ore. 1966); see 1 R. ANDERSON,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201:99(i), at 131 (2d ed. 1970).
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the common law bona fide purchaser. The history of the recent Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals case of Samuels & Co. v. Mahon3 5 illustrates
some problems with thisapproach.
Before the trend toward enlargement of the concept of a good faith
purchaser becomes irreversible, it may be advisable to reconsider the
policy and reasoning that has led to this expansive interpretation of section 2-403. The basic policy of the draftsmen of article 2 was to make
goods in commerce as freely transferable as possible.3 6 This is the justification for the protection of the good faith purchaser in all cases except.
where the original owner failed to transfer voidable title because possession was lost involuntarily and not under a transaction of purchase.
The ultimate implementation of this policy would be to protect all
types of purchasers who arguably fall within the Code catchall definition of purchase as a voluntary transaction creating an interest in
property. This would encompass secured parties with both perfected
and unperfected security interests, as well as "floating liens." To find
that holders of unperfected security interests are good faith purchasers
under section 2-403 would have the effect of disturbing article 9 priorities in those jurisdictions which have amended section 2-702(3) to
delete "lien creditor," presumably with the result that a lien creditor
cannot defeat a reclaiming seller. In such a situation, an unperfected
secured party would defeat a lien creditor in spite of section 9301 (1) (b), which subordinates an unperfected security interest to a lien
creditor. a7
Most situations in which the reclaiming seller attempts to assert his
rights will be commercial in nature. More than likely, insolvent buyers
will have at least one creditor who has an article 9 security interest in all
of his property by virtue of a "floating lien." The recent Samuels
decision illustrates how the courts may deal with the equities of the
reclaiming seller vis-h-vis such a secured party. 88 The court reasoned
that since the secured party had acquired his interest by contract, it was a
voluntary transaction. 9 Therefore, he was a good faith purchaser
35. 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), rev'g 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.
1975) (en banc). The problem in Mahon was initially before the Fifth Circuit in Samuels & Co. v. Mahon, 483 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom., Mahon v. Stowers,
416 U.S. 100 (1974).

36. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403, Comment 1.
37. Compare id. § 2-702(3), with id § 9-301(1)(b).
38. Samuels & Co. v. Mahon, 526 F.2d 1238, 1242-43 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
39. Id. at 1242-43.
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within the meaning of Code section 2-403 and would prevail over a
seller reclaiming under section 2-702."°
A security agreement covering after-acquired property is a voluntary
contract, but it seems that a security interest obtained only by virtue of

the security agreement's broad coverage of after-acquired property is an
unconscious purchase and hardly voluntary as to those particular
goods. 4' The inequities of allowing a reclaiming seller to be defeated
by a secured party who has a "floating lien" and has advanced no new

value or by an imperfected secured party are obvious.
There are several arguments for narrowly construing the word "purchaser" in section 2-403 to include only those who purchase the goods

themselves and have the enjoyment interest and the right to possession
(i.e., title and not just a security interest in them). The preamble to section 1-201 indicates that the definitions there may not apply if the
context otherwise requires," and the scope of article 2 does not include
consensual security transactions since they are left to article 9.43

That "[a] person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title
to a good faith purchaser for value" cannot be doubted because these

are the exact words of the Code.44

It does not necessarily follow,

however, that these words mean a person with voidable title has the
power to transfer a valid and enforceable security interest to a good faith

purchaser for value. It is awkward to speak of title to a security interest
since reference to the concept of title usually means the paramount

rights of ownership and not merely an interest that secures performance
of an obligation.4"

The Code in section 2-401 (1) declares that "[a]ny

40. Id. at 1247.
41. Judge Braucher has apparently referred to the secured party whose only interest
in collateral is that the security interest has attached to it as after-acquired property as
an unconscious purchaser. Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy,
1 N. MEX. L. REV. 435, 458 n.119 (1971).
42. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201.
43. Id. § 2-102.
44. Id. § 2-403(1).
45. Id. § 2-401. The preamble to this section reads in part: "Each provision of
this Article with regard to the rights, obligations and remedies of the seller, the buyer,
purchasers or other third parties applies irrespective of title to the goods except where
the provision refers to such title." The draftsmen's comments to this section then state
that:
This Article deals with the issues between seller and buyer in terms of step by step
performance or non-performance under the contract for sale and not in terms of
whether or not "title" to the goods has passed. That the rules of this section in
no way alter the rights of either the buyer, seller or third parties declared elsewhere
in the Article is made clear by the preamble of this section.
Id. § 2-401, Comment 1. The downgrading of title with the qualification that it is still
viable where referred to in other sections creates some difficulties. It injects into the
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retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods

shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a
security interest."46 Thus, the Code is obviously recognizing a distinc-

tion between title and security interest. As a final indicator that title
and security interests are not to be equated, section 2-403(4) requires
that one look elsewhere for the rights of secured parties.4 7
On the other hand, the most persuasive reason for not reading the
word "purchaser" narrowly is that to do so would deny to secured
parties, without discrimination as to date or kind of interest, all protec-

tion as good faith purchasers pursuant to section 2-403.

A narrow

interpretation would force these parties, in a search for their rights, to
look to article 9 or supplementary general principles of law as authorized by section 1-103.48
In the wake of In re Kravitz,4 9 a search through article 9 would be at
least as confusing and futile as was the search in that article for the

rights of a lien creditor. Furthermore, although prior law recognized the
superior rights of mortgagees and pledgees of specific property, resort to
the general principles of law would also be unavailing since the "floating
lien" is largely a Code innovation and pre-Code law does not deal with

the "floating lien" in the context of a bona fide purchaser.
The draftsmen of article 2 apparently intended an encompassing
approach to the term "purchaser." "Buyer," a defined term, could have
been used instead of "purchaser." 0 Moreover, the comments to section
Code the confusing, amorphous concept of title, sometimes described as a complex bundle of rights, duties, powers and immunities. Standard Oil Co. v. Clark, 163 F.2d 917,
930 (2d Cir. 1947); People v. Walker, 90 P.2d 854, 855 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939).
It creates the paradox that a secured party under section 2-403 defeats a seller reclaiming
under section 2-702. Here the secured party claims a valid security interest given by
a buyer with a voidable title, pursuant to a section that allows a party with a voidable
title to transfer good title. Prior law, however, distinguished title from a security interest. Premium Commercial Corp. v. Kasprzycki, 29 A.2d 610, 614 (Conn. 1942) (outcome depended upon whether the plaintiff had a lien or title).
46. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-401(1). Similar language may be found in
id. § 1-201(37) and this would tend to reinforce the proposition that the Code recognizes that title is not the equivalent of a security interest.
47. Id. § 2-403(4). Professor Shanker suggests that the presence of the words "lien
creditor" in section 2-403(4) may be intended to exclude lien creditor from the purchaser definition. Shanker, A Reply to the Proposed Amendment of UCC Section
2-702(3): Another View of Lien Creditor'sRights vs. Rights of a Seller to an Insolvent,
14 WESTERN RES. L. REV. 93, 101-02 (1962).
48. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-103.
49. 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960).

50. See

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 2-103(1)(a) where it states that a buyer

is a person "who buys or contracts to buy goods."
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2-403 state that the section applies to any form of purchase. 5 "Purchaser," therefore, when read in the context of section 2-403 to mean
only the buyer of the goods themselves is too narrow.
A possible solution would be for the courts to exclude from the
meaning of the section 2-403 purchaser those secured parties having
only an unperfected security interest or whose only interest in the goods
as collateral is the interest which attached to the goods as after-acquired
property without the securing party's having given new value, such as
the floating lienor. 52 The context in which the word is used in section
2-403 requires such a reading in order to avoid difficulties raised by the
issues of priority and non-voluntary transfer. Thus, an alteration of the
meaning of "purchaser" in that section would be justified by the preamble to section 1-201. Further, subordinating the rights of the floating
lienor or unperfected secured party to the rights of a reclaiming seller
under section 2-702 would parallel the policy subordinating the rights of
prior secured parties to the rights of those who obtain purchase money
security interests, as reflected in section 9-312, 53 and to the rights of
buyers in the ordinary course of business, as reflected in section 9-307.54
HI. The Lien Creditor
The lien creditor is the last class of third parties whose rights interact
with those of the reclaiming seller. This classification has stirred more
controversy and created more judicial uncertainty than any other third
party class for at least two reasons. First, the trustee in bankruptcy is
given the status of a lien creditor as of the date of bankruptcy by
virtue of the Bankruptcy Act. 55 His rights, however, are left to state
law,5 6 of which the Uniform Commercial Code is a notable example.
Since the reclaiming seller's rights under section 2-702 are dependent on
the buyer's being insolvent, it is hardly surprising that bankruptcy
trustees are frequently involved in attendant litigation. Second, section
2-702 is .especially obscure as to its meaning with regard to lien creditors. Section 2-702(3) states "[t]he sellers right to reclaim . . . is
subject to the rights of . . .a lien creditor under this Article (Section 251. Id. § 2-403, Comment 1.
52. See note 41 supra.

53. See

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 9-312.

54. See id. § 9-307.

55. Bankruptcy Act § 70c, 11 U.S.C. § 1t0(c) (1970).
56. See Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961)
U.S.C ,§110(c) [1970]).
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403) . '' 7 If this is meant as a cross-reference to section 2-403 as a
source of the rights of a lien creditor, it is futile, for that section merely
refers one to other pertinent articles to ascertain the lien creditor's
rights.5"

With this kind of curious draftsmanship, it is hardly surprising that
courts and commentators have gone in all directions in analyzing who
this lien creditor is and what his rights are. While Professor Kennedy
has illustrated the uncertainty of attempting to define "lien," 5 9 much less

"lien creditor," under the Code, a definition of "lien creditor" may be
found in section 9-301(3)1 0 and it seems fair to assume that this may be
at least a partial definition of the lien creditor referred to in section 2-

702(3).'61

The Permanent Editorial Board felt it could cut through this gordian
knot by simply deleting the words "or lien creditor" from section 2-

702(3) and it so recommended in 1966.2

At the time, Professor

Braucher, who was chairman of the subcommittee which made the
recommendation, traced the history of section 2-702 and concluded that
the words "or lien creditor" had somehow slipped into the 1952 Official
Draft after that section's text had been approved and that it was "highly
probable that it was regarded as an insubstantial editorial change." 63
57. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702(3) (1962 version).
58. Id. § 2-403(4), Article 9 contains a definition of lien creditor, but it is concerned primarily with rionconsensual liens. See id. § 9-301(3). The article 1 definition does not specifically say "lien creditor," but rather talks in terms of a "security interest." Id. § 1-201(37). But by reference to the definition of "purchase," it is clear
that the draftsmen intended it to be a lien. See id. § 1-201(32). The frustration which
anyone attempting to rationalize this maze will.experience is well illustrated by the discussion in Kennedy, The Interest of a Reclaiming Seller Under Article 2 of the Code,
30 Bus. LAW. 833, 834-36 (1975). Professor Kennedy does conclude that
[lt is quite clear that Article 9 is not intended to create or deal with the creation
of a lien or security interest other than a consensual one. Likewise, Article 9 is
not intended to proscribe the priority of any lien or security interest except that
of a consensual security interest, either in its relation to another of the same category or in relation to a lien of a different variety.
Id. at 835-36. But see Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 CoM.
L.J. 269, 271 (1970).
59. See generally Kennedy, The Interest of a Reclaiming Seller Under Article 2 of
the Code, 30 Bus. LAW. 833, 834 (1975).
60. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301(3) states that a lien creditor is one who
has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy, or the like and
includes an assignee for benefit of creditors from the time of assignment, and a
trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition or a receiver in
equity from the time of appointment.
61. But see Samuels & Co. v. Mahon, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam);
Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 COM. L.J. 269 (1970).
62.

U.C.C. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD, 1966
(1967).

OFFICIAL RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR

AMENDMENT OF THE UCC 1

63. Braucher, Reclamation of Goods from a Fraudulent Buyer, 65 MICH. L. REv.
1281, 1287 (1967).
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While proponents of the deletion of "lien creditor" felt this resulted in a

complete resolution of the problems insofar as the lien creditor was
64
concerned, others had doubts.

Barring such repeal of the term "lien creditor" from section 2702(3), perhaps the most logical course is to seek the rights of the lien

creditors first within section 2-702(3). This requires some ingenuity,
and while at least two commentators have attempted it, apparently no
courts have been equal to the task.65 Professor Countryman has developed his thesis most fully and it is his suggestion that the provision
should be read to mean that the seller's rights are subject to the lien of a
lien creditor. 66 The only problem with this interpretation is that the

Code does not read this way. Section 2-702(3) says that the reclaiming
seller's rights are "subject to the rights of a lien creditor" and this does
not imply "subordinate to the rights," much less "subject to a lien." Of
course, a rather logical argument can be made that the obvious "right"
of a lien creditor is a lien, but this does not answer any question as to the
content of the right.
64. Compare Ashe, Reclamation Under UCC-An Exercise in Futility: Defrauded
Seller v. Trustee in Bankruptcy, 43 REF. J. 78 (1969), with Hawkland, The Relative
Rights of Lien Creditorsand Defrauded Sellers-Amending the Uniform Code to Conform with the Kravitz Case, 67 COM. L.J. 86, 88 (1962). Professor Shanker in Shanker,
A Reply to the Proposed Amendment of UCC Section 2-702(3): Another View of Lien
Creditor'sRights vs. Rights of a Seller to an Insolvent, 14 WESTERN RES. L. REv. 93, 101
(1962) suggested that the "good faith purchaser" of section 2-702(3) may include a
"lien creditor," and these doubts received apparent support in the case of In re Good
Deal Supermarkets, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 887 (D.N.J. 1974). New Jersey had adopted the
1966 amendment at the' time in question, but the trustee won over a reclaiming seller
and it is not clear what theory was adopted by the court. Further, Judge Godbold's dissent in Samuels & Co. v. Mahon, 510 F.2d 139, 159 (5th Cir. 1975), which was later
adopted as the, opinion of the court in 526 F.2d 1238, 1247 (1976) (per curiam),
stated that "[lien creditors are included in the definition 'purchasers.'"
The dissent
pointed out that the United States Supreme Court did not specifically hold that a trustee
in bankruptcy was a good faith purchaser. The Court merely referred to the trial
court's holding of that fact and it was the dissent's contention that the majority was
incorrect in so characterizing that reference to be a holding of the Court. Samuels &
Co. v. Mahon, 526 F.2d 1238, 1254-56 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
65. See generally Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N.
MEX. L. REV. 435, 457 (1971); Shanker, Bankruptcy and Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 40 REF. J. 37, 41-42 (1966); Shanker, A Reply to the Proposed Amendment of UCC Section 2-702(3): Another View of Lien Creditor's Rights vs. Rights of
a Seller to an Insolvent, 14 WESTERN REs. L. REV. 93, 98 (1962).
Some cases have
apparently assumed the superiority of a lien creditor's rights over those of a reclaiming
seller. In re Units, Inc., 3 UCC REP. SERV. 46 (D. Conn. 1965) (referee opinion);
In re Eastern Supply Co., 1 UCC REP. SERV. 151 (W.D. Pa. 1963), af/'d per curiam,
331 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1964); In re Goodson Steel Corp., 10 UCC REP. SERv. 387 (S.D.
Tex. 1968) (referee opinion); In re Behring & Behring, 5 UCC REP. SERV. 600 (N.D.
Tex. 1968) (referee opinion).
66. Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N. MEx. L. REv.
435, 457 (1971).
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Although Professor Shanker did not detail his views as to what rights,
he found in section 2-702(3), s7 and although it is plain that he considered the argument to be a separate one, Shanker suggested a possible
further source of the lien creditor's rights through section 2-702(3).
Noting that the section states the rights of lien creditors are those found
"under this Article (Section 2-403)," he suggests that article 2 in
its entirety is available to seek the rights of lien creditors.6 s With
such a finding, section 2-326 must be examined.6 9 The first two
subsections of this section deal inter alia with the narrow concept of
goods delivered on a sale or return basis. Such goods are subject to the
claims of the buyer's creditors. It is the third subsection which is of
interest here, for Bankruptcy Act terminology suddenly appears; certain
types of sales are deemed equivalent to sale or return transactions."0
The conditions of such transactions are typically met by a seller delivering goods to an insolvent buyer when they are delivered to the buyer for
sale and the buyer normally deals in goods of this kind under his own
name. Professor Kennedy had earlier recognized that the language of
subsection 3 of 2-326 could be found to encompass this type of transaction, 71 but he felt that the context of the section ruled out its application
to the problem of the seller reclaiming from the insolvent buyer.7 2 In
view of the contortions required to make any sense of the Code's
treatment of the problem, context arguments seem weak. As Professor
Shanker pointed out, there must be some purpose for the third subsection of section 2-326 because it handles problems with which many
78
creditors, including lien creditors, are faced.
67. He does argue persuasively that the cross reference to article 9 by way of UCC
section 2-403 does give the definition of lien creditor to be employed in connection with
UCC section 2-702(3). Shanker, A Reply to the Proposed Amendment of UCC Section
2-702(3): Another View of Lien Creditor'sRights vs. Rights of a Seller to an Insolvent,
14 WESTERN RES. L. REV. 93, 98 (1962).

68. Id. at 99.
69. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-326.
70. Id. § 2-326(3). To be "deemed" a sale or return transaction, there must be two
elements in the delivery of the subject goods: (1) the goods must be delivered to a person for sale, and (2) the person who receives the goods must maintain a place of business at which he deals in goods of this kind under a name other than the name of the
person making the delivery. As Professor Shanker notes, this would probably limit the
scope of section 2-326(3) to the sale of inventory items. Shanker, A Reply to the Proposed Amendment of UCC Section 2-702(3): Another View of Lien Creditor's Rights
vs. Rights of a Seller to an Insolvent, 14 WESTERN RES. L. REV. 93, 99-100 (1962).
71. Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code:
Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 518, 551 n.137
(1960).
72. Id. at 551.

73. This once again raises the interesting question as to whether the 1966 recom-
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While no court seems to have adopted this rationale, the case of In re
Federal's,Inc.7 1 obviously used such reasoning as antecedent to the basis
of its opinion. In that case the reclaiming seller made his claim after the
bankruptcy of the buyer. In a subsequent dispute the district court
affirmed the bankruptcy judge's ruling in favor of the trustee who was
asserting his status as a lienor under section 70c of the Bankruptcy
Act. Faced with a higher court ruling that the source of the lienor's
rights in section 2-702(3) is state law outside of the Code,7 5 the judge
held that there was no relevant law in Michigan on the point, but that, if
faced with the problem, the Michigan Supreme Court would hold that,
by analogy to section 2-326(3), the seller had a secret lien which must
yield to intervening creditors including the lien creditor bankruptcy
trustee.7 6
It can be argued that the reference of section 2-702(3) to section 2403 was intentional and that section 2-403 does indeed confer rights
upon the lien creditor. Section 2-403(1) provides in part that "[a]
person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good
faith purchaser for value. '7 7 The definition of purchase includes a lien
or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property.78
Value is given when rights are acquired as security for a pre-existing
debt. 79 Thus it can be argued that the lien creditor takes by lien
when he levies upon the goods and becomes a purchaser within the
definition with the value being given by securing his pre-existing judgment debt with the lien.
There are two difficulties, however, with this argument. First, since
section 2-403 (4) states that "[t]he rights of other purchasers of goods
and of lien creditors" 80 are to be found in other articles of the Code, it
can be argued that the use of the word "and" indicates the rights of lien
creditors are to be found elsewhere. Second, it appears from the
definition that "purchase" is intended to cover only a voluntary transfer
mended change has made any significant difference with reference to the bankruptcy

trustee, or any other lien creditor for that matter. One must constantly keep in mind
that section 2-702 deals with the rights of the reclaiming seller versus the insolvent buyer
and only additionally deals with the rights of third parties in such a situation.
74. 402 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1975).

75. Mel Golde Shoes, Inc. v. Meinhard Commercial Corp., 403 F.2d 658, 660-61
(6th Cir. 1968).
76. In re Federal's, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1357, 1362 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
77. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403(1).
78.
79.
80.

Id. § 1-201(32).
Id. § 1-201(44)(b).
Id. § 2-403(4) (emphasis added).
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of property. The lien acquired by the lien creditor upon his levying
upon the goods is not a voluntary transfer of property.8 '
On the other hand, it can be argued that section 2-403(4) was not an
attempt to exclude lien creditors from section 2-403, but rather was an
attempt to indicate that the rights given under section 2-403 are not
exclusive or preemptive of the rights under article 9. This argument
finds support in the comment which states: "[e]xcept as provided in
subsection (1), the rights of purchasers . . . are left to the Articles on
Secured Transactions .
"..."82
It must be conceded that there are difficulties with the second
point that the interest of a lien creditor cannot be equated with the
definition of purchase in section 1-201 since the interest is not created
by a voluntary transaction, but by operation of law.8
Although the
Code does not specifically define lien and generally uses it in a context of an involuntary or non-consensual interest, 84 must it be assumed that lien as used in the definition of purchase is used in the
same involuntary sense even though the context would indicate otherwise? Common law precedents, for whatever their value, only vaguely
indicate a positive answer. Generally, it was held that a creditor of the
fraudulent buyer was not a bona fide purchaser so as to defeat the
reclaiming seller, especially when the credit was extended before the
sale,85 and apparently the same rule was applied against the trustee in
bankruptcy.8"
These concepts formed the rationale of In re Kravitz,87 which is
81. See Shanker, A Reply to the Proposed Amendment of UCC Section 2-702(3):
Another View of Lien Creditor'sRights vs. Rights of a Seller to an Insolvent, 14 WESTERN RES. L. REV. 93, 101-02 (1962); cf. Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in
Bankruptcy, 1 N. MEx. L. REv. 435, 458 (1971).

82. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403, Comment 4. This idea may have influenced the thinking of the majority in the latest Samuels holding. Samuels & Co. v.
Mahon, 526 F.2d 1238, 1241 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
83. Kennedy, The Interest of a Reclaiming Seller Under Article 2 of the Code, 30

Bus. LAw. 833, 838-39 (1975). It may be questioned whether the lien here is any less
involuntary than the automatic security interest in proceeds under section 9-306.
84. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 9-301(3) defines lien creditor, while section 9-310
makes it plain that "lien" is used not only in a judicial lien sense but including "a lien
. . .given by statute or rule of law .... ." Id. § 9-310.
85. 3 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 308-309.1, at 313 (2d ed. 1956); see 3
S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS §§ 636-37, at 448-57 (rev. ed.

1948).
86. See generally 4A COLLIER ON
1976).
87. 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960).

BANKRUPTCY
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perhaps the best known case involving the problems raised herein.
There the court was faced with a reclaiming seller who fit squarely
within the provisions of Code section 2-702 and a trustee in bankruptcy, who claimed the goods as a lien creditor under section 70c of the
Bankruptcy Act and whose lien had become effective before the seller
had repossessed the goods. The court went from Code section 2-702
to section 2-403 and thence to section 9-301. It concluded that section
9-301 furnished the intended definition of a lien creditor, but not the
rights of such a person and that this would have to be determined by
the controlling pre-Code state law. 88 Pennsylvania law dictated that
where credit was extended to the buyer after the sale, the creditor was a
purchaser who would be given protection against a reclaiming seller, so
the court concluded that the trustee qualified under the Bankruptcy Act
section 70c and therefore prevailed over the reclaiming seller. 89 The
same reasoning was followed in Mel Golde Shoes, Inc. v. Meinhard Commercial Corp.,90 by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. A different result from Kravitz was reached, however, since the applicable preCode law of Kentucky allowed a reclaiming seller to prevail over a levying creditor. 9 '
Therefore, it would seem that the law has come full circle, and as to
the rights of lien creditors, little has changed. This is true regardless of
whether section 2-702 makes the reclaiming seller's rights subject to
those of a "lien creditor" or whether those words have been deleted from
the section.
There are, however, several possible fallacies in this proposition.
First, it assumes that the reclaiming seller is the same as the pre-Code
reclaiming seller and that he has the same equities. This is not the
case. It further assumes that the lien creditor cannot qualify as a
Code good faith purchaser as distinct from the pre-Code bona fide
purchaser. This assumption may be erroneous, for the good faith purchaser is a new, statutory creature whose composite definition may encompass the lien creditor classification. Finally, this proposition assumes
that all bankruptcy courts will feel bound to defer to the Code presumption of fraud on the part of the insolvent buyer, thereby resolving trustee
versus reclaiming seller conflicts under Code concepts.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 822.
Id. at 822-23.
403 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 660.
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THE NATURE OF THE SELLER'S RIGHT TO RECLAIM

This section will concern the conflict between the proposition that the
seller has the right to reclaim goods as a substitute for their price and the
proposition that his right to reclaim is to secure performance. Both
propositions will be explored in order to determine which one prevails
and the rights of a reclaiming seller that arise from such a determination.
There is some justification for the maxim that those who can, think,
and those who cannot, classify. Nevertheless, in light of the complete
confusion existing among the cases and the great disagreement between
the commentators, some classification must be attempted and it necessarily involves the forcing of concepts into arbitrary slots. An attempt to
cross-reference the concepts to different slots will be made in the text;
therefore, a schematic has been furnished to aid comprehension:
SELLER'S RIGHT TO RECLAIM
GT

TO

I GHT TO RECLAIM TO

tAS

SECURE PERFORMANCE

SUBSTITUTE FOR PRICE

CODIFIrCATION OF]
COMMON LAW

CODE SUBSTITUTE

VOIDABLE PRIRTIE

I.

LIEN

FOR COMMON LAW

STATUTORY

SECURITY
INTEREST

Right to Reclaim the Goods as a Substitute for the Price
A.

Codificationof the Common Law Right to Undo the Transaction

The first category considered involves the right to undo the transaction when the Code is interpreted as a codification of the common law
right to rescind for fraud. There is considerable evidence that the
draftsmen of the Code felt that the correct characterization of the nature
of the seller's right to reclaim was that it is a right to reclaim the goods
as a substitute for the price 2 and should be treated as no more than the
codification of the generally accepted pre-Code rule that where fraudulent representations of solvency were made to a deceived seller, he had a
right to reclaim his goods from the wrongdoing buyer. This rule
allowed a seller to'rescind the contract and reclaim indentifiable goods
92. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702, Comment 2.
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upon a showing that the buyer knowingly made a false representation
9
upon which the seller had relied in entering into the contract of sale. 3

The problem with this approach is that the Code does not contain any
language to that effect. It is doubtful that there is a right of rescission under the Code absent actual fraud or mutual mistake. 94 Even

assuming that in this peculiar situation the common law right has
survived, none of the conditions for its pre-Code exercise are contained
in section 2-702(3). All that is necessary is that the buyer receive
goods while insolvent and that the seller demand their return within ten
days of such receipt unless a misrepresentation of solvency has been
made in writing to the seller within three months before the goods are

delivered, which extends the time for a demand indefinitely. 95 Appar-

ently, a representation by the buyer, other than the three month written
representation clause, or knowledge of the buyer's financial status by the

seller is immaterial.

Thus, the concepts of deceit and fraud are no

longer necessarily present, although in most cases they will be.9 6

B.

A Code Substitute for the Common Law Right to Undo the
Transaction

If the reclaiming seller's right under the Code is to undo the transaction but is fashioned out of different cloth than the pre-Code right,
93. E.g., O'Rieley v. Endicott-Johnson Corp., 297 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir. 1961); Manly
v. Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384, 385 (4th Cir. 1928); In re Weissman, 19 F.2d 769, 771
(2d Cir. 1927); In re B. & R Glove Corp., 279 F. 372, 378 (2d Cir. 1922); In re Monson, 127 F. Supp. 625, 626 (W.D. Ky. 1955).
94. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-1, at 248-49

(1972); see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-608,
Comment 1. But cf. id. § 2-721.
95. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE i§ 2-702(2). See Henson, Reclamation Rights of

Sellers under Section 2-702, 21 N.Y.L.F. 41' (1975) for a good discussion of the elements of section 2-702(3).
96. Despite the Official Commentator's statement, it is not necessarily true that the
section "takes as its base line the proposition that any receipt of goods on credit by an
insolvent buyer amounts to a tacit business misrepresentation of solvency and therefore is fraudulent as against the particular seller."

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-

702, Comment 2. No doubt the draftsmen were making an attempt to fit the section
within that line of bankruptcy cases beginning with Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U.S. 631
(1876). There the Court held that "a party not intending to pay, who, as in this instance, induces the owner to sell him goods on credit by fraudulently concealing his in-'
solvency and his intent not to pay for them, is guilty of a fraud which entitles the vendor
• . . to disaffirm the contract .... ." Id. at 633. They concluded that the bankruptcy
trustee stood in the same position as the bankrupt buyer. Some cases have gone so far
as to hold that proof of insolvency creates a rebuttable presumption of an intent not
to pay. In re Paper City Mill Supply Co., 28 F.2d 115 (D. Mass. 1928); Fisher v.
Shreve, Crump & Low Co., 7 F.2d 159, 160 (D. Mass. 1925). But mere failure to disclose does not seem to be enough. See Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in
Bankruptcy, 1 N. MEX. L. REV. 435, 454 (1971).
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there seems no reason to give other than literal interpretation to the
Code's provisions dealing with the rights of the three classes of third
parties, so long as only state law is concerned. Since it is not always
easy to determine what the literal interpretation should be, there is
more reason to examine pre-Code analogies than if the seller's right is
otherwise characterized.
Thus, there should be no difficulty in determing that a buyer in the
ordinary course should defeat the reclaiming seller. Generally, the
same may be said for the good faith purchaser. It is clear that the
holder of an article 9 security interest may qualify as a good faith
purchaser. a7 Should he, however, be deemed such when his only
interest in the property sought to be reclaimed is a security interest by
virtue of an after-acquired property clause in a security agreement
which antedates the delivery of the goods by the seller? It has already
been suggested that such an unconscious purchaser is not a good faith
purchaser for value and should not defeat a reclaiming seller. 98 It is
also possible that such a secured party could be met with the argument
that he has not given the kind of value required in the concept of a good
faith purchaser for value. In a situation involving purely state law,
however, section 9-108 may allow the secured party to prevail because of the legislative definition of "new value" in that section.9 9 However, unless this argument or the unconscious purchaser argument is
allowed, there will be relatively few successful reclaiming sellers because it is likely that there will be a "floating lienor" in a commercial
situation in which finances have obviously become so precarious.
C.

Voidable Priorities

In those states which have not adopted the 1966 amendment to
section 2-702(3), if the "lien creditor" can be defined and his rights
found, then he too should prevail over the reclaiming seller. The
bankruptcy trustee, acting under section 70c of the Bankruptcy
Act,' should also prevail under these provisions, but he has another
argument available as well. Although it is not a preference, since with
an undoing of the sale it is concluded that there is not a transfer'' as is
97. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
98. See text accompanying notes 41 and 42 supra.
99. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-108.
100. Bankruptcy Act § 70c, 11 U.S.C. 110(c) (1970).
101. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
60.18, at 841-45 (14th ed. 1975). Judge
Braucher, however, seems to suggest that there may be a transfer when the seller exercises reclamation rights, but another requirement for a preference fails-that the creditor
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required by section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act, 10 2 a reclamation provi-

sion, such as section 2-702(3), looks a great deal like a state 0 created
3
priority which is invalid under section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act.'
In summary, the seller can reclaim the goods only in the event the
buyer is insolvent.

In all other situations where he has delivered, he

must rely on an action for the price-he is totally unsecured unless he,
has taken a consensual security interest.'
II. Right to Reclaim the Goods to Secure Performance (Payment) or
Lien
If the same right to undo the transaction as was present before the1

passage of the Code no longer exists, just what is the nature of the
seller's right in section 2-702? A right in or charge on property to
secure a performance (payment) is almost a classic definition of a
lien; 10 5 consequently, the character of the nature of the seller's right has
perplexed many a court and commentator. 106
obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class.
Braucher, Reclamation of Goods from a FraudulentBuyer, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1281, 1295
(1967).
102. Bankruptcy Act .§ 60a, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1970).
103. Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). Prior to 1938, persons who by
state law were entitled to priority were entitled to a priority under the Bankruptcy Act.
3A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 64.01[2], at 2047-49 (14th ed. 1975). After the 1938
amendment, only a state statutory landlord's lien was given any priority. Bankruptcy
Act § 64a(5), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(5) (1970). The committee report stated uncategorically "[aill state priorities have been deleted except in the case of a landlord . . . .'
H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1937).
If the reclamation right is a
priority, it must fail because Congress has made no allowance for it. See In re Federal's, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1357, 1367-68 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Braucher, Reclamation of
Goods from a Fraudulent Buyer, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1281, 1295 (1967); Countryman,
Buyers and Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N. MEX. L. REV. 435, 444 (1971); King,
Reclamation Petition Granted: In Defense of the Defrauded Seller, 44 REP. J. 81
(1970). Contra, Telemart Enterprises, Inc. v. Holzman, 524 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 1466 (1976) (holding right to reclaim a priority);
Mel Golde Shoes, Inc. v. Meinhard Commercial Corp., 403 F.2d 658, 660-61 (6th Cir.
1968).

104.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 2-709.

105. 51 AM. JUR. 2d Liens § 1 (1970).
106. See, e.g., Samuels & Co. v. Mahon, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam); In re Federal's, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1357, 1367 (E.D. Mich. 1975); In re Good
Deal Supermarkets, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 887, 888 (D.N.J. 1974). Although all the commentators have not agreed, they have recognized, either happily or otherwise, that the
legal effect of section 2-702 might be to create a lien. Bjornstad, Reclamation of Goods
by Unsecured Sellers in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 24 DRAKE L. REv. 357, 366 (1975);
Braucher, Reclamation of Goods from a FraudulentBuyer, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1281, 1294
(1967); Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N. MEX. L. REV.
435, 444 (1971); Kennedy, The Interest of a Reclaiming Seller Under Article 2 of the
Code, 30 Bus. LAw. 833, 840-41 (1975); King, Reclamation Petition Granted: In Defense of the DefraudedSeller, 44 REF. J. 81, 82 (1970).
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If a seller's Code-based reclamation right is a lien, then it must be
either a statutory or consensual lien. Regardless of the classification
applied, if the seller's right to reclaim is a lien, it is a secret lien and the
arguments discussed earlier are applicable and, if adopted, would defeat
the seller in a contest with creditors of the buyer. Such creditors would
include the bankruptcy trustee regardless of whether the legislature had
or had not adopted the 1966 official amendment to section 2-702(3)
10 7
deleting the "or a lien creditor" language.
A.

Statutory Lien

If the seller's right to reclaim is a statutory lien, then the rights of the
other parties indicated by section 2-702(3) are superior to the extent
previously discussed in this article. In other words, there is no reason not to give effect to declared state policy regardless of the characterization of the seller's right so long as only state law is involved.' 08
The reclaiming seller should, however, lose to the bankruptcy trustee
claiming the goods on behalf of the bankrupt buyer's estate. Section
67c(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Act' 0 9 provides that the trustee can
avoid or preserve a lien created by statute 10 and which is first effective
on the insolvency of the bankrupt. While a technically logical argument
can be made that the event which creates the lien is the delivery of the
goods, such an argument deserves the fate given to it in the Federal's
case.1 ' There the court stated that "'realistically viewed', the right to
107. See generally UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702(3) (1966 version); text accompanying notes 70-74 supra.
108. The state rights of these parties was thoroughly discussed in the first section of
this article. The statutory lien classification has a separate significance only in bankruptcy.
109. Bankruptcy Act § 67c(1)(A), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)A (1970).
110. The Bankruptcy Act § 1(29a), 11 U.S.C. § 1(29a) (1970) defines "statutory

lien" for bankruptcy purposes. See In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La.), alf'd,
402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969).

Here the district

court, in an exhaustive opinion, considered the effect of what is known as the "vendor's
privilege" under Louisiana Civil Law. The "privilege" was available to allow a nonpaid seller to reclaim goods from the defaulting buyer. The Court stated:
mhe Louisiana Civil Law system provides security devices to certain classes of
persons which, in the common law might be called liens. The vendor's privilege
cannot be excluded from the definitional coverage under Section 1(29a) [of the
Bankruptcy Act defining statutory lien] merely because Article 3227 [of the La.

Civ. Code] uses the word "privilege" instead of "lien" . . . .
In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620, 623 (W.D. La.), aII'd, 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969). Is this what the UCC drafters attempted to do in
section 2-702? The Court concluded the privilege was a statutory lien. See also In re
J.R. Nieves & Co., 446 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1971).

111. In re Federal's, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1975). Although the court

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

23

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 8 [2022], No. 2, Art. 3

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 8:271

reclaim under section 2-702(2) is a statutory lien which attaches only
upon the insolvency of the debtor and is, therefore, invalid as to the
trustee or receiver in bankruptcy by virtue of section 67c(1) (A) .'112
If the seller's reclamation right is considered to be a statutory lien,
then a second ground exists for invalidating that right against the trustee
qua such a lien. Section 67c(1) (B) of the Bankruptcy Act provides
generally that a statutory lien which is not perfected or enforceable
against a bona fide purchaser at the date of bankruptcy is not enforceable against the trustee."' While section 67c(1)(B) is not a model of
clarity,"' the First Circuit Court of Appeals in In re J.R. Nieves &
Co.," 5' construed a civil law seller's privilege similar in purpose to
section 2-702 of the Code and found, after assuming that it was a
statutory lien, that it fell before the trustee under the provisions of the
subsection."' The trial court had concluded that the reclamation right
given by the Puerto Rican Civil Code was a lien, but that it was not
invalid against bona fide purchasers." 7 The First Circuit reversed,
finding that the inquiry under the Bankruptcy Act is "whether the lien i
so perfected that, in the absence of bankruptcy, a subsequent bona fide,
purchaser would acquire no rights to the goods . . . [and] whether that
lien is strong enough to prevent [such] a subsequent bona fide purchaser from [so] taking."' 18 The court concluded that the seller's reclamation lien would not be good against a bona fide purchaser and, therefore, was not good against a trustee. It is submitted that if Code section,
2-702 does create a statutory lien, it is subject to the rights of a good,
faith purchaser under section 2-403, and by the same reasoning applied,
by the First Circuit Court of Appeals here to the civil law seller's right
of reclamation, a trustee of the buyer should prevail." 9
partially relied on section 2-326(3), it found that section 2-702 also creates a statutory
lien as a separate reason for its decision. Id. at 1367.
112. Id. at 1367. The court concluded that: "Thus, as § 2-702 operates within the
context of bankruptcy, it must be viewed as essentially the type of device with which
Congress was concerned when § 67c(1)(A) was enacted." Id. at 1368. Contra, Telemart Enterprises, Inc. v. Holzman, 524 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, - U.S.
-, 96 S. Ct. 1466 (1976); Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 519
P.2d 354 (Colo. 1974).
113. Bankruptcy Act § 67c(1)(B), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(B) (1970).
114. See Marsh, Triumph or Tragedy? The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1966, 42
WASH.L. REV. 681, 721-23 (1967).
.115. 446 F.2d 188 (lst Cir. 1971).
116. Id. at 190.
117. Id. at 190, citing In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La. 1968).
118. In re J.R. Nieves & Co., 446 F.2d 188, 191 (1st Cir. 1971).

119. Id. at 191. The principal difficulty expressed by the First Circuit was that to
perfect his rights under civil law a "bona fide purchaser" must take possession. There
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Security Interest

If one concedes that the nature of the seller's reclamation right is to

secure performance (payment), then it must also be conceded that the
right fits the definition that a "'[s]ecurity interest' means an interest in
personal property . . . which secures payment or performance of an
obligation.' 120 Objections to characterizing the right as a security
interest may be made, however, on the ground that it is not denominated
a security interest as, for example, is done in Code sections 2-401 and 2505.121 But this argument is weakened by comment 1 to section 9-113

where rights "similar to the rights of a secured party"'122 are characterized as security interests within article 9 except as limited by section 9-

113, and the comment goes on to refer to sections 2-506, -703, -705,
-706, -707, and -711. Of the six sections, only section 2-711 specifically characterizes the interest granted as a security interest. 123 It has
sometimes been thought that the failure to enumerate section 2-702
should exclude it, but if it fits the definition the comment can not do
124

SO.

If the seller's reclamation right is a security interest, it is a security
interest arising under article 2 and is made subject to article 9 by section
9-113 with the exceptions noted therein. In Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v.
would seem to be no such difficulty in the section 1-201(32) definition of purchase.
Moreover, as the court points out, section 1(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1(5)
(1970) contains a definition of bona fide purchaser which includes a pledge or encumbrance. ln re J.R. Nieves & Co., 446 F.2d 188, 192 (1st Cir. 1971). The court dealt
with the very difficult provisions of section 67c(1)(B) wherein the lienor is given certain rights to perfect subsequent to bankruptcy. It concluded that:
The solution is to limit . . . the provisos to those state liens in which the laws creating them provide specifically for perfection against bona fide purchasers by recording, seizure, or other means of actual or constructive notice. . . . Since [the
particular section of the Puerto Rican Code creating the seller's right of reclamation]
. . by its own terms does not provide protection against bona fide purchasers, we
hold it is not perfectable after bankruptcy and therefore is not valid against the
trustee.
Id. at 193-94. The same must surely be said of the seller's right under sections 2-702
and 2-403.
120. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(37); see Samuels & Co. v. Mahon, 526
F.2d 1238, 1247 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Kennedy, The Interest of a Reclaiming
Seller Under Article 2 of the Code, 30 Bus. LAw. 833, 837 (1975); Shanker, A Reply
to the Proposed Amendment of UCC Section 2-702(3): Another View of Lien Creditor's Rights vs. Rights of a Seller to an Insolvent, 14 WESTERN RES. L. REv. 93, 102-05
(1962).
121. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE H9 2-401(2), 2-505,(2).
122. Id. § 9-113, Comment 1.
123. Id.§ 2-711(3).
124. See Shanker, A Reply to the Proposed Amendment of UCC Section 2-702(3):
Another View of 'Lien Creditor's Rights vs. Rights of a Seller to an Insolvent, 14
WESrEaRN REs. L. REv. 93, 102-05.(1962).
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Colorado Springs National Bank,'2 5 the Colorado court addressed the
issue of whether the reclaiming seller's right was a security interest.
Although the seller was a cash seller, the court apparently analogized its
right to that of a credit seller. 2 " The case involved a seller of automobiles who was found to have a right to reclaim against its buyer. Before
reclamation, the buyer granted a bank a security interest in the automobiles. Before the bank perfected the security interest, the seller repossessed the automobiles and claimed it had a security interest by virtue of
its reclaiming seller's right and that such interest had been perfected by
repossession prior to the bank's perfection of its article 9 security
interest. If this argument had been successful, then the seller would
have presumably triumphed by use of sections 9-113 and 9-312. The
court concluded that the seller's right was not a security interest, but was
merely a right to undo the transaction' 2 7 and that nothing in article 2
indicated such a right was superior to an unperfected security interest, so
the bank prevailed.'
In the Samuel's case,' 29 on the other hand,
the reclaiming seller was held to have had an unperfected security interest and the Fifth Circuit concluded that it too must fail as against a
perfected article 9 security interest.3
Of course, if the seller's interest
is an unperfected security interest, then a mechanical reading of the Code
will dictate that he will lose to a trustee in bankruptcy.' 3 ' A very good
argument can be made, however, that if the reclaiming seller's right is a
security interest, it is automatically perfected."3 2 Section 9-113 is
entitled "Security Interests Arising Under Article on Sales" and provides:
A security interest arising solely under the Article on Sales
(Article 2) is subject to the provisions of this Article except that
to the extent that and so long as the debtor does not have or does
not lawfully obtain possession of the goods
125. 519 P.2d 354 (Colo. 1974).
126. Id. at 359.
127. Id. at 359-60.

128. Apparently the bank was allowed to succeed as a good faith purchaser.
129. Samuels & Co. v. Mahon, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
130.

Id. at 1247.

131. Where section 2-702(3) has not been amended, it states that the reclaiming seller's right is subject to a lien creditor's rights and cross-refers to § 2-403 which in turn
cross-refers to article 9. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702(3) (1962 version).

Section 9-301(3) defines lien creditor to include the bankruptcy trustee and section 9301(1) subordinates an unperfected security interest to that of a lien creditor. See id.
§§ 9-301(1), (3). The same result could be obtained by comparing § 70c of the
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970), with section 9-301.
132. See Henson, Reclamation Rights of Sellers Under Section 2-702, 21 N.Y.L.F. 41,
49-50 (1975); Shanker, A Reply to the Proposed Amendment of UCC Section 2-702(3):
Another View of Lien Creditor'sRights vs. Rights of a Seller to an Insolvent, 14 WEST-

EN RPus. L. REv. 93, 102-05 (1962).
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(a) no security agreement is necessary to make the security interest enforceable; and
(b) no filing is required to perfect the security interest; and
(c) the rights of the secured party on default by the debtor
are governed by the Article on Sales (Article 2)."1

If there has been actual fraud on the part of the buyer-debtor or if the
provision for a presumption of fraud found in comment 2 to section 2702 correctly states the law other than when a bankruptcy trustee is
involved,1 34 then it is not difficult to find that the buyer-debtor has not
lawfully obtained possession of the goods. If so, no filing is necessary
to perfect.'
If this reasoning is sound, the reclaiming seller will defeat
the trustee in bankruptcy as a lien creditor, 1 6 but he will still lose to a
buyer in the ordinary course"1 7 and to a buyer with an after-acquired
property clause in his security agreement. 88
C.

Voidable Preference

Professor Williston, at an early date, recognized that a seller exercising his reclamation rights under section 2-702 within four months of the
bankruptcy of the buyer might be found to have obtained a preferential
transfer that could be voided by the trustee of the buyer's estate."19 A
133. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-113 (emphasis added).
134. Absent federal supremacy considerations in bankruptcy matters, there is nothing
inherently conflicting in the acceptance of the official comment's "presumption of fraud"
and considering the right created by section 2-702 as a security interest. See id. § 2702, Comment 2.
135. Of course, absent a written misrepresentation, the right to reclaim will last only
10 days. Id. § 2-702(2). It is interesting to note that this is exactly the same grace
period allowed a non-inventory purchase money secured party to perfect and maintain
priority. While it is doubtful that the reclaiming seller's right should be characterized
as a purchase money security interest (because it simply does not meet the conditions
of Section 9-107), the similarities of function and the identical time periods allowed permit the argument that the credit seller's reclamation right should be characterized as a
security interest. Compare id. § 2-702(2), with id. § 9-107.
136. Id. § 9-301 (1) (b) by implication indicates a prior perfected security interest defeats a lien creditor. Of course, this does not consider whether the presumption of
fraud would stand in the bankruptcy proceeding.
137. See id. §§ 2-403, 9-307(1).
138. This would be true as a result of the application of section 9-312(5) dealing
with priorities between secured parties, since the article 9 secured party would have filed
first. It would be equally true through the effect of section 2-403 in that priority would
be given to good faith purchasers over reclaiming sellers. This latter statement is correct unless there is acceptance of the argument made in the conclusion of this paper
that the article 9 secured party, whose sole interest in the goods is by an after-acquired
property clause, would not be a good faith purchaser unless he gives new value after
the goods come into possession of the buyer-debtor.
139. See Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code,
63 HARv. L. RIv. 561, 585 (1950).
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preference under the Bankruptcy Act is a transfer made or suffered by
the bankrupt of his non-exempt property for or on account of an
antecedent debt within four months of bankruptcy. It must have been
made for the benefit of a creditor while the debtor was insolvent thus
enabling the creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than
some other creditor of the same class, and it must have occurred when
the creditor had reasonable cause to believe the debtor to be insolvent at the time of the transfer.' 40 Finally, the transfer is deemed
to have taken place when no lien could become superior to the rights of
the transferee.14 ' A cursory reading suggests that this definition of a
preferential transfer describes exactly the reclaiming seller. This view
has been summarily dismissed, however, on the assumption that a Code
reclaiming seller is the same legal creation as the pre-Code creature. 42
The theory as to pre-Code reclamation was, again, that the most the
buyer received was a voidable title and that in the case of fraud the
transaction was simply undone and there was no transfer when the seller
repossessed. The theory was not unique to the problem of a reclaiming
seller, 43 but this is not the situation today under the Code. There need
be no actual fraud on the part of the buyer, and even actual knowledge
of insolvency on the part of the seller is irrelevant. Moreover, from a
technical standpoint, Code section 2-401(2) makes it plain that title
passes to the buyer upon delivery of the goods unless otherwise explicitly
agreed. 44
While there are policy arguments as to whether the concept of a
voidable preference should be applied to the reclaiming seller, 4 ' this is
140. Bankruptcy Act §§ 60a(l), b, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96(a)(1), (b) (1970); see J. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 244, at 872 (1972).
141. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1970).
142. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I 60.51A[8], at 1050.19 (14th ed. 1975); see
Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some
Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 518, 555 (1960).

143. See 3

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

60.18, at 841-45 (14th ed. 1975).

144. A question may arise as to whether the reclaiming seller's right is subject to de-

feat by a lien "obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract."
Bankruptcy Act § 60a(4), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(4) (1970).

The answer is plainly "yes"

where the 1966 Amendment deletion of "lien creditor" in Section 2-702(3) has not
been adopted. Even in those states which have adopted the amendment, the definition of purchase in section 1-201(32) may be broad enough to include a non-consensual lien. If the seller repossesses before bankruptcy, so long as the repossession
takes place within the four month period, it is voidable; if no repossession has occurred,
the perfection against the trustee is deemed to have taken place immediately prior to

bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1970).
145. Bjornstad, Reclamation of Goods by Unsecured Sellers in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 357, 365 (1975).
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not the question. The Code's draftsmen and those who would profit by
the policies they espouse cannot have it both ways. Having been drawn
as a technical statute designed in many cases to defeat the general
creditor and his representative the trustee, 4 6 the Code must be tested
4
by the words of the Bankruptcy Act.'1
CONCLUSION

It seems reasonably safe to predict that the courts will continue to
read section 2-702(3) of the Code as if it said that the rights of the
reclaiming credit seller are subordinate to the rights of the buyer in the
ordinary course, the good faith purchaser, and, where not repealed by
the legislature, the lien creditor. A clear understanding of the identity
of the buyer in the ordinary course is established by the Code. 4 ' The
identity of the latter two, however, is more uncertain and the cases, as
previously indicated, will probably remain in conflict.
The bankruptcy trustee is a third party who may prevail over the
reclaiming seller. He is given the status of a lien creditor by the
Bankruptcy Act, section 70c 49 and is so defined by the Code.' 50 He
may well have the power to defeat the reclaiming seller under either
section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act,' 5 ' as a state law established priority,
or as a statutory lien under section 67.152 On occasion he may be able
to utilize the preference avoiding powers of section 60153 or his right

to avoid a transfer that is avoidable under state law by a creditor having
a provable claim.'

54

Assuming the trustee is successful, he may still run afoul of a secured
party holding a security interest covering the after-acquired property of
the debtor. There seems little reason for such a secured party to receive
such a windfall to the exclusion of other creditors.' 55 A possible
146. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-108.
147. It is interesting to note that the draftsmen of the Official Comments concede
the reclamation right is preferential. Comment 3 to section 2-702 states "the right . . .
to reclaim goods under this section constitutes preferential treatment as against the buyer's other creditors . . . ." Id. § 2-702, Comment 3. Of course this is not necessarily
voidable preferential treatment.
148. Id. § 1-201(g).
149. Bankruptcy Act § 70c, .11 U.S.C. § I10(c) (1970).
150. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301(3).
151. 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
152. Bankruptcy Act § 67c(l)(A), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(A) (1970).
153. See id.§ 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970).
154. See id. § 70e(1), 11 U.S.C. § 1710(e)(1) (1970).
155. It was just such an injustice which troubled the court in Samuels & Co. v.
Mahon, 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976) (per
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solution to this problem lies in a strict construction of who is a "good
faith purchaser." Conceding that one who takes a security interest in
good faith and for value is such a purchaser, it does not seem especially
difficult to say that the value given must be new value.' 5 6 This would
result in the secured party having to make advances or additional
advances subsequent to the insolvent buyer's receipt of the goods and in
reliance on his possession of them." 7 Thus, absent other parties with
superior rights, the reclaiming seller would prevail.
If there is a bankruptcy trustee with such superior rights, as there may
well be, this result does not seem particularly unjust.1 8 As has been
pointed out, the policy in bankruptcy made evident by the Congress is
one of increasing hostility to secret liens or reservations of rights and
disguised priorities.' 5 9 No state policy or, perhaps more accurately,
curiam). This problem caused the dissenting judge to state that "[m]y brothers have
not concealed that their orientation in the case before us is to somehow reach a result
in favor of the sellers . . . because it seems the "fair" thing to do. . . . Doing what
seems fair is heady stuff." 510 F.2d at 154. The dissent was adopted by the court as
the majority opinion. 526 F.2d at 1242.
156. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
157. See generally Countryman, Buyers and Sellers o1 Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N.
MEX. L. REV. 435 (1971). While one may disagree with the result, the Florida Supreme
Court did far more to achieve equity between a non-perfected purchase money security
interest holder and a prior perfected secured party whose claim to the collateral was
based on an after-acquired property clause. In International Harvester Credit Corp. v.
American Nat'l Bank, 296 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1974), the court concluded that the prior
perfected secured party would have priority over the non-perfected purchase money secured party, but only to the extent of the debtor's equity in the collateral.
158. Professor Hawkland has stated that "[i]n a credit economy, such as ours, sellers
are expected to assume the risk that their buyers will remain solvent long enough to
make payment." Hawkland, The Relative Rights of Lien Creditorsand Defrauded Sellers-Amending the Uniform Commercial Code to Conform to the Kravitz Case, 67
COM. L.J. 86 (1962).
159. Common law liens and priorities, as have been discussed here, in a debtor's estate, were affected little by the Bankruptcy Act as passed in 1898. See 3A COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY T 64.01[2.1], at 2047 (14th ed. 1975); 4 id.
67.20[l], at 208.1.
Since that time numerous amendments have evidenced Congressional antipathy towards both state created priorities and statutory liens. See generally Kennedy, The
Interest of a Reclaiming Seller Under Article 2 of the Code, 30 Bus. LAw. 833, 843-44
(1975). The amendments of 1950 to section 60 of the Act state "tt]he recognition of
equitable liens where available means of perfecting legal liens have not been employed
is hereby declared to be contrary to the policy of this section" and rendered such liens
voidable as preferences. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(6), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(6) (1970). See
generally 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
60.50, at 1031 (14th ed. 1975). In 1938, and
again in 1966, amendments restricted the efficacy given statutory liens and it has been
stated that:
Notwithstanding the long established bankruptcy principle that valid liens should be
enforceable in their entirety as against general, unsecured creditors and those entitled to priority, the realization developed that state created statutory liens, like
state priorities, to the extent they are recognized in bankruptcy run counter to the
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policy thought wise by the drafters of the UCC can override the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act as a matter of constitutional law. 60 '
Moreover, a court which concludes that the seller's Code reclamation
right is not subject to defeat by the bankruptcy trustee could still limit
such a right, as a matter of federal bankruptcy law, to pre-Code reclamation rights (i.e., where the equities favor the seller as in the case of
actual fraud on the buyer's part). There seems to be no logical reason
why the "equities," the kind of fraud which will permit a seller to exercise his state given right of reclamation against a bankruptcy trustee,
should not be a determination of federal law.' 6 ' This would have the.
effect, insofar as the trustee is concerned, of returning the situation to
pre-Code status which may well be the best solution.
underlying objective of equitable distribution of the debtor's assets among all his
creditors.
4 id. 67.20, at 223.
160. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2; id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. As early as 1901 the Supreme
Court stated that the power of the Congress to legislate national bankruptcy laws which
supersede state legislation in proper exercise of the Constitutional mandate is unlimited.
Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 192 (1902).

161. It must be admitted that the determination of the degree of fraud on the part

of the buyer necessary to be shown by the reclaiming seller to overcome the trustee was
held to be a matter of state law. In re Federal's, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1357, 1364 (E.D.
Mich. 1975); 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
70.41, at 483 (14th ed. 1976). But see
Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N. Max. L. REV. 435, 454
(1971).
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